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In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we
study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that so-
cial orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over
infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with eﬃciency, consistency
and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function
satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.
Keywords: indivisible good, social ordering function, leximin.
JEL classiﬁcation: D63, D71.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Consider that a group of agents have to assign objects among them. All
objects are desirable but each agent may consume at most one object. Let
us think of appartments in a housing complex, seats at a concert, parking lots,
tasks in a board of directors, etc. Since the value of the objects may diﬀer
considerably among agents and between objects, monetary compensations
are allowed for those who do not receive any objects or who receive an object
∗Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton), F.N.R.S. and University of Namur (Bel-
gium).
I thank Marc Fleurbaey for his very useful suggestions, and seminar participants at Uni-
versity of Montreal and University of Rochester for their comments.
1they deem of low value. What could be an equitable way of assigning objects
among those agents, and how should the compensations be computed?
The standard approach to this problem consists in looking for allocation
rules (see Thomson [22] for a survey). An allocation rule speciﬁes which
feasible assignments are the most desirable as a function of the parameters
of the problem, that is, the set of agents, the set of objects, and the agents’
preferences over the objects. An alternative approach consists in looking
for social ordering functions. A social ordering function speciﬁes a complete
ranking of the feasible allocations as a function of the parameters.
This paper deals with such social ordering functions. In many circum-
stances, indeed, it is not suﬃcient to know which assignments are the most de-
sirable. The main reason comes from information and incentive constraints,
which often prevents the planner from reaching ﬁr s tb e s ta l t e r n a t i v e s .G i v e n
agents’ incentive to misreveal their preferences, given the information they
own about each other, the set of reachable alternatives may have very dif-
ferent shapes, and typically does not contain the most desirable alternatives.
Having deﬁned a social ordering allows the planner to solve the normative
problem in all those cases, by simply maximizing the ordering under the
relevant incentive constraints.1
Several recent studies of fairness in economic domains have succeeded in
building social ordering functions based on fairness properties (see Fleurbaey
[6], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [8] and Maniquet
and Sprumont [12]). That undertaking is clearly related to the social choice
tradition of deﬁn i n gs o c i a lw e l f a r ei ns u c hm o d e l s . T h es o c i a lc h o i c el i t e r -
ature, however, has focussed on properties of independence with respect to
changes in preferences, and it has mainly uncovered impossibility results (see
Le Breton and Weymark [11] for a survey). In the recent literature on social
ordering functions, independence properties are weakened and the emphasis
shifts towards fairness properties.
This paper is at the intersection of those two branches of literature. In-
deed, we combine an independence property borrowed from social choice
literature with consistency and fairness properties borrowed from fair social
ordering literature and still obtain a possibility result (moreover, we char-
acterize a unique social ordering function). The independence property we
1I n c e n t i v e sa r en o tt h eo n l yr e a s o nw h yﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n sm a yn o tb ea v a i l a b l e .F o r
instance, there may exist a status quo and reallocating objects may be too costly, so that
only changes in monetary compensations are possible. Or there may be other feasibility
constraints.
2study requires that the social orderings be independent of preferences over
infeasible alternatives (cfr. Plott [16]; see Le Breton and Weymark [11] for
a survey on applications of the Plott axiom in economic domains). In our
setting, this amounts to requiring that preferences over objects which are not
available should not matter, which seems extremely natural.
The ﬁrst, intermediary, result we present in this paper oﬀe r su sac h a r a c -
terization result of the social ordering functions which satisfy our indepen-
dence property together with eﬃciency and consistency requirements. This
result makes clear why traditional social choice theory and the fair allocation
literature can be reconciled in the assignment of indivisible objects model.
Indeed, the key feature of this model turns out to be that it is always possible
not to assign any object to an agent (while, maybe, compensating her for not
receiving anything). Therefore, there exists a non-degenerate part of agents’
consumption set their preferences over which always matter. The result says
the following: when combined with eﬃciency and consistency requirements,
the independence property forces us to focus on that part of the consum-
tion sets, that is, on what can be called the money utilities. It turns out
that money utilities information are suﬃcient to build complete rankings of
feasible allocations, whatever those allocations are.
Our second and main result shows that it is possible to use fairness prop-
erties to select among all possible rankings based on money utilities. But it
turns out that not all degree of inequality aversion is ﬁnally allowed in this
setting. Indeed, the only social ordering function which is compatible with
an anonymity axiom and an appropriate version of the Pigou-Dalton princi-
ple of transfer2 turns out to be the money utility leximin function (according
to the leximin, a vector is preferred to another one if the smallest element of
the former is larger than that of the latter, or, in case of a tie, if the second
smallest element is larger, and so on).
One core issue in welfare economics has traditionnally been the design of
social objectives suitable for applications in resource allocation (or realloca-
tion) problems. By mainly uncovering impossibilities, the theory of social
choice in economic environment has failed to oﬀer suitable objectives. By fo-
cussing on allocation rules, the theory of fair allocation has oﬀered objectives
which are diﬃcult to use in applications. By combining those approaches,
2This principle says that a money transfer from a richer agent to a poorer one decreases
inequality. In the-one dimensional income inequality measurement framework, this prin-
ciple is compatible with any degree of inequality aversion (see, e.g., Chakravarty [4]).
3this paper proposes a way out of the dilemma. Whether or not the new
approach can be applied to other problems of interest to public economics is
the question addressed by the recent studies of social ordering functions, a
question which remains largely open.
The paper is organized as follows. We deﬁne the model in Section 2. We
deﬁne our main axiom, Independence of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles,
as well as other axioms in Section 3, where we also develop and discuss our
ﬁrst result. Then, we deﬁne the fairness axioms in Section 4 and prove our
main result. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2T h e m o d e l
Let us begin with an example. A university department has a set of housings
on campus to allocate to visitors. There are more visitors than housings,
and no rights have been a priori allocated to visitors. Housings have to
be allocated, and visitors who are not assigned campus housing should be
given a compensation or a subsidy to ﬁnd a housing elsewhere. All visitors
would prefer to be located on campus. The process of allocating housings
should depend on visitors’ preferences over them. If this process consists
of deﬁning a complete ranking on possible ways of allocating housings and
organizing transfers among visitors, then the department will be able to
deal with feasibility constraints such as visitor i was already present last
year and should not be asked to move, visitor j suﬀers from allergies and
should not be located too close to visitor k who has a pet, housing a need
repair and is no longer available, etc... Moreover and most importantly,
when the assignment process is chosen, if it turns out that visitors are likely
to manipulate information regarding their preferences, then the department
has to design a revelation mechanism and may choose among the available
mechanisms the one that is likely to yield the highest possible assignment in
the ranking.
There is an inﬁnite set A of objects, and an inﬁnite set N of agents. In
speciﬁc economies, agents may be assigned either an available object from
A or no object at all. In the latter case, we say that this agent receives the
“null object”, which is denoted ν.L e t A∗ ≡ A ∪ {ν}.A n economy is a
list E =( N,A,R) consisting of a ﬁnite set of agents N ⊂ N,aﬁnite set of
objects A ⊂ A,a n daﬁnite list of preferences R =( Ri)i∈N deﬁned on A∗×R.
We assume that there are at least two agents and that there is at least one
4object to assign but never more objects than agents, that is, #N ≥ 2a n d
1 ≤ #A ≤ #N.L e tIi be the indiﬀerence relation associated to Ri,a n dPi
the strict preference relation. We assume that preferences are continuous and
strictly monotone with respect to money. We also assume that all objects
are desirable and their values is always ﬁn i t e ,t h a ti s ,f o ra l l( ai,m i) ∈ A×R,
(ai,m i) Pi (ν,m i), and there exists m0
i ∈ R,s u c ht h a t( ai,m i) Ii (ν,m 0
i). Let
R denote the set of all such preference relations. Let E denote the set of all
such economies.
A bundle for an agent i ∈ N in an economy E =( N,A,R) ∈ E is a
pair zi =( ai,m i) ∈ A ∪ {ν}×R.A feasible allocation for an economy
E =( N,A,R) ∈ E is a list z =( zi)i∈N such that no two agents are assigned
the same “real” object, all assignments are from the set of available objects,
and the sum of monetary compensations does not exceed 0. Let Z (E)d e n o t e
the set of feasible allocations for E,t h a ti s ,z =( ( ai,m i))i∈N ∈ Z (E)i fa n d
only if
aj = ak ⇒ aj = ν = ak,




Feasible allocations are thus deﬁn e di naw a yw h i c ha l l o w su st oa s s i g no n l y
a subset of the available objects. We come back to this assumption in the
conclusion. For an economy E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, for a feasible allocation
z ∈ Z(E), for M ⊂ N, we write RM to denote the restriction of R to
members of M,a n dzM to denote the similar restriction of z.
A social ordering for an economy E =( N,A,R) ∈ E is a complete,
reﬂexive and transitive ranking of the feasible allocations. A social ordering
function R associates to each economy E ∈ E a social ordering R(E)f o rt h i s
economy. Let I be the indiﬀerence relation associated to R,a n dP the strict
preference relation.
3 Independence axiom and the money utility
property
In order to deﬁne social ordering functions, we impose axioms capturing
some desirable property for such functions. Our main axiom in this paper
5is borrowed from the (Arrovian) social choice theory on economic domains.
It was introduced by Plott [16] in the abstract framework, and later applied
to economic domains (see Le Breton and Weymark [11]). We call it Inde-
pendence of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles. It requires that changes
in agents preferences which leave unaﬀected their preferences over feasible
bundles should not aﬀect the social ordering. Formally,
Independence of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles For all E =
(N,A,R), E0 =( N,A,R0) ∈ E, if for all i ∈ N,a,a0 ∈ A ∪ {ν},m,m 0 ∈ R,
(a,m) Ri (a
0,m





then for all z,z0 ∈ Z(E),
z R(E)z
0 ⇔ z R(E
0)z
0.
Independence of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles can only have con-
sequences over the social ordering function if the set of available objects is
allowed to vary. The following axiom is inspired by the Consistency property
which has been extensively studied in the fair allocation literature (see Thom-
son [21]). Consistency usually applies to allocation rules. It requires that if
an allocation is selected for an economy, then the suballocation obtained by
removing a subset of agents with their assignments of good and money be
also selected for the subeconomy (see Tadenuma and Thomson [19]). Adapt-
ing this property in our setting, we obtain the following Consistency axiom.
If an allocation is socially as good as another, and if a subset of agents are
assigned exactly the same bundles in both allocations, then removing those
agents with their assignments should not change the social preference, that
is, the suballocation obtained from the ﬁrst allocation by removing those
agents should still be as good for the subeconomy as the suballocation ob-
tained from the second allocation, provided those suballocations are feasible
in the subeconomy. Formally,
Consistency For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E,M ⊂ N,z,z0 ∈ Z(E), if zi = z0
i for
all i ∈ N \ M,t h e n
z R(E)z













6N o t h i n gp r e v e n t su su pt on o wf r o ma s s i g n i n gt h eo b j e c t si n d e p e n d e n t l y
of preferences. We therefore impose Paretian type axioms. In this paper we
stick to the traditional Strong Pareto requirement and its weak consequence
of Pareto Indiﬀerence. Strong Pareto requires that if each agent weakly
prefers her assigned bundle in one allocation over that in another, then the
former allocation be also weakly preferred by the society to the latter. If, in
addition, at least one agent strictly prefers the former allocation, then it is
also strictly preferred. Strong Pareto will only be used in the next Section,
but we deﬁne it here, due to its logical relationship with Pareto Indiﬀerence,
which will play a crucial role in our ﬁrst result.
Strong Pareto For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z,z0 ∈ Z(E), if zi Ri z0
i for all
i ∈ N,t h e nz R(E)z0. If, in addition, zj Pj z0
j for some j ∈ N,t h e nz P(E)z0.
Pareto Indiﬀerence requires that two allocations which are deemed equally
good by all agents be also viewed socially equivalent.
Pareto Indiﬀerence For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z,z0 ∈ Z(E), if zi Ii z0
i for
all i ∈ N,t h e nz I(E)z0.
In our ﬁrst result, we characterize the class of social welfare functions
which satisfy our main axiom, Independence of Preferences over Infeasible
Bundles, together with Consistency and Pareto Indiﬀerence.I fas o c i a lo r -
dering function satisﬁes those three axioms, then it also satisﬁes the property
that in order to evaluate two allocations, only the quantity of money leaving
the agents indiﬀerent between their assigned bundles and not receiving any
object matters. This quantity of money is called the money utility of the
corresponding bundle. Money utilities allow us to construct numerical repre-
sentation of each preference relation. That only money utility matters comes
from the fact that, since it is always possible to assign the null object to an
agent, the part of the consumption set where money utilities are computed is
always part of the set of feasible bundles, and, more precisely, is the proper
intersection of all the possible sets of feasible bundles. By the assumption
that the values of the objects are always ﬁnite, it turns out that the infor-
mation given by the money utilities is all what matters for the construction
of social ordering functions.
Money Utility Property For all E =( N,A,R),E0 =( N,A0,R 0) ∈ E,f o r
















0 ⇔ y R(E
0)y
0
Lemma 1 If a social ordering function R satisﬁes Independence of Prefer-
ences over Infeasible Bundles, Consistency,a n dPareto Indiﬀerence,t h e ni t
satisﬁes the Money Utility Property.
Proof. We begin with the following important claim.
Claim: Let E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z,z0 ∈ Z(E). Let e E =
³
e N, e A, e R
´
∈










∈ E.L e t e z ∈ Z(e E). If R satisﬁes Consistency,
then
z R(E)z
0 ⇒ (z,e z)R(E, e E)(z
0,e z), and
z P(E)z
0 ⇒ (z,e z)P(E, e E)(z
0,e z).
Suppose the ﬁrst relation of the claim is wrong, that is, z R(E)z0,w h e r e a s
(z0,e z)P(E, e E)(z,e z). A similar proof works for the second relation. By
Consistency,( z0,e z)P(E, e E)(z,e z)i m p l i e st h a tz0 P(E)(z), the desired con-
tradiction which proves the claim.
Back to the proof of the lemma. To simplify the notation, let money utility
be measured by a function u : R×(A∗ × R) → R deﬁned by
u(Ri,z i)=m ⇔ zi Ii (ν,m).
Let us suppose that R satisﬁes Independence of Preferences over Infeasible
Bundles, Consistency,a n dPareto Indiﬀerence.L e t E =( N,A,R), E0 =
(N,A,R0) ∈ E, z,z0 ∈ Z(E), and y,y0 ∈ Z(E0) be such that
u(Ri,z i)=u(R
0







Let us assume that
z R(E)z
0. (2)
We have to prove that y R(E0)y0.L e tn =# N. We begin by constructing
two sets of n bundles which are infeasible for E.L e tε > 0. Let e m, e m0 ∈ RN
be deﬁned by
e mi =m i n{−ε,u(Ri,z i) − ε}
8e m
0
i = e mi if zi Ii z
0
i,
e mi − ε if zi Pi z
0
i,
e mi + ε if z
0
i Pi zi.
Let e A ⊂ A be such that e A ∩ (A ∪ A0)=∅ and # e A = n,s ot h a tw ec a nﬁnd
ab i j e c t i o nσ : N → e A.L e te N ⊂ N be such that e N ∩ N = ∅ and # e N = n,
so that we can ﬁnd a bijection ρ : N → e N.L e te z,e z0 ∈
³
e A × R
´ e N
be deﬁned
by: for all i ∈ N,
e zρ(i) =( σ(i), e mi),
e z
0
ρ(i) =( σ(i), e m
0
i).
Let R ∈ RN be such that for all i ∈ N,a,a0 ∈ A ∪ {ν},m,m 0 ∈ R,
(a,m) Ri (a
0,m
0) ⇔ (a,m) Ri (a
0,m
0),
and for all i ∈ N,
zi Ii e zρ(i) and z
0
i Ii e z
0
ρ(i). (3)
By the way e z and e z0 were constructed, such preferences exist. By Indepen-







Let e E =
³
e N, e A, e R
´
∈ E with e R ∈ R
e N being deﬁned by: for all i ∈ N,
e Rρ(i) = Ri. (5)
By Consistency and the claim above, Eq (4) implies
(z,e z) R
³






By Pareto Indiﬀerence, and Eqs (3) and (5),
(e z,z) R
³













9Let R ∈ RN be the list of preferences which coincides with R on the bundles
having an element of e A∪{ν} as ﬁrst component, and with R0 on the bundles
having an element of A0∪{ν} as ﬁr s tc o m p o n e n t ,t h a ti s ,f o ra l li ∈ N,a,a0 ∈
e A ∪ {ν},b,b 0 ∈ A0 ∪ {ν},m,m 0 ∈ R,
(a,m) Ri (a
0,m

















Let e e R ∈ R
e N be deﬁned by for all i ∈ N,
e e Rρ(i) = Ri. (9)
By Consistency and the claim above, Eq (8) implies
(e z,y) R
µ
N ∪ e N,A
0 ∪ e A,
µ




By Pareto Indiﬀerence and Eqs (1), (3), (5) and (9),
(y,e z) R
µ
N ∪ e N,A
0 ∪ e A,
µ

















Before introducing fairness properties into the anlysis, let us discuss the
result presented in Lemma 1. Welfarism, as is well-known, is the view that
individual utilities are all what matters for equitable social decision making.
Resource allocation decisions should all be reached by considering impacts
on individual utilities. Once impacts on utilities are determined, choices are
10made on ground of an aggregation rule of individual utilities. This aggre-
gation rule does not depend on the speciﬁcc h o i c et ob em a d e ,n o ro nt h e
speciﬁc utility function of the agents (the literature has extensively studied
the plausible aggregation rules; see d’Aspremont and Gevers [5]). On the
other hand, it does not say anything about how (cardinally measurable and
comparable) individual utilities shoulc be constructed.
It turns out that the Money Utility Property is equivalent to welfarism.
But, moreover and more importantly, it also tells us how to construct utility
representations of the preferences, a sw ea r el e f tw i t hn oc h o i c eb u tt oa g -
gregate money utilities, that is, the quantities of money which leave agents
indiﬀerent between consuming their assigned bundles or consuming the null
object and receiving those quantities of money. Formally, the money utility
function u : R×(A∗ × R) → R is deﬁned by u(Ri,z i)=m ⇔ zi Ii (ν,m).
M o n e yU t i l i t yW e l f a r i s mFor all N ∈ N, there exists an ordering RN on






where ui = u(Ri,z i)a n du0
i = u(Ri,z0
i)f o ra l li ∈ N.
Lemma 2 A social ordering function R satisﬁes the Money Utility Property
if and only if it satisﬁes Money Utility Welfarism.
Proof. “if”: Let E =( N,A,R),E0 =( N,A0,R 0) ∈ E, z,z0 ∈ Z(E), and






where ui = u(Ri,z i)a n du0
i = u(Ri,z0
i)f o ra l li ∈ N,a n d
y R(E
0)y
0 ⇔ v R
N v
0
where vi = u(R0
i,y i)a n dv0
i = u(R0
i,y0















then for all i ∈ N, ui = vi and u0
i = v0
i. Gathering the above relations yields
z R(E)z
0 ⇔ y R(E
0)y
0.
11“only if”: Let R satisfy the Money Utility Property.L e t u s ﬁx N ∈ N
throughout the proof, and let us call EN the set of economies where the set
of agents is N.L e tE ∈ EN.L e tX (E) ⊂ RN be deﬁned by:
x ∈ X (E) ⇔∃z ∈ Z (E)s . t .xi = u(Ri,z i),∀i ∈ N.
By our assumption on preferences, X(E)i sc o m p a c t .F o rx,x0 ∈ X (E), we
write xRN x0 if and only if there exist z,z0 ∈ Z (E) such that for all i ∈ N,
xi = u(Ri,z i), x0
i = u(Ri,z0
i)a n dz R(E)z0.B yt h eMoney Utility Property,
RN is an ordering on X (E). Let E0 ∈ EN and let X (E0)b ed e ﬁned as above.
Let x,x0 ∈ X (E) ∩ X (E0). Let z,z0 ∈ Z(E), and y,y0 ∈ Z(E0)b es u c ht h a t
for all i ∈ N, u(Ri,z i)=u(R0
i,y i)a n du(Ri,z0
i)=u(R0
i,y0
i). By the Money
Utility Property, z R(E)z0 ⇔ yR(E0)y0. This proves that R is welfarist in its
ranking over all allocations having a money utility representation in X (E).
Now, E was chosen arbitrarily. So R is welfarist on X (E)f o ra l lE ∈ EN.I t
remains to show that ∪E∈ENX (E)=RN.L e tx ∈ RN.W em u s tc o n s t r u c t
E ∈ EN such that x ∈ X (E). For all i ∈ N,l e tai ∈ A be such that ai 6= aj
for all j 6= i,a n dl e tRi ∈ R be such that
xi ≥ 0 ⇒ u(Ri,(ai,0)) = xi, and
xi < 0 ⇒ u(Ri,(ai,x i)) = xi.
Let A = ∪i∈Nai.L e t E =( N,A,R). By construction, E ∈ EN.L e t z be
deﬁned by: for all i ∈ N, zi =( ai,min{0,x i}). By construction, z ∈ Z (E).
Also, u(Ri,z i)=xi for all i ∈ N.T h e r e f o r e ,x ∈ X (E).
In conclusion, in this speciﬁc model of indivisible good assignment with
money, combining Independence of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles, Con-
sistency and Pareto Indiﬀerence forces us to be welfarist and to use money
utility as the proper indicator of individual welfare. But there is no restric-
tion yet on how to aggregate money utilities. We come to this question in
the next Section.
4 Fairness and the money utility leximin
The fair allocation literature which focusses on allocation rules has proposed
a long list of equity axioms (see Moulin and Thomson [14]). One of the basic
axioms, often called Equal Treatment of Equals, requires that if two agents
have the same preferences, then they be assigned the same bundle, or at least,
12bundles they deem equivalent. Here we consider two possible adaptation
of this requirement to our current framework. The ﬁrst one is borrowed
from Fleurbaey [6]. It refers to the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer. This
principle is at the heart of inequality measurement theory. It requires that an
income transfer from an agent to a poorer one reduce inequality, as long as the
income ranking of those two agents remains unaﬀected. That principle clearly
favors equality but is consistent with any degree of inequality aversion. The
Fleurbaey generalization of this principle to multi-dimensional framework like
our requires that if two agents have the same preferences and are assigned
bundles which do not lie on the same indiﬀerence curve, then a money transfer
from the agent having been assigned the bundle they both prefer to the other
agent be viewed a strict social improvement, provided there is no reversal in
the indiﬀerence curve ranking, that is, provided both agents still consider the
ﬁnal bundle assigned to the ﬁrst agent at least as good as that assigned to
the second one.3
Transfer Principle among Equals For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z =
((ai,m i))i∈N, z0 =( ( a0
i,m 0
i))i∈N ∈ Z(E), if there exist j,k ∈ N such that
Rj = Rk and for all i 6= j,k,zi = z0
















Our second fairness axiom captures the anonymity content of the classical
Equal Treatment of Equals axiom. It requires that if two agents have the
same preferences, then permuting the two bundles they are assigned in an
allocation yield an allocation the society deems equivalent. This requirement
is also compatible with any degree of inequality aversion.4
Anonymity among Equals For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z, z0 ∈ Z(E), if
there exist j,k ∈ N such that Rj = Rk and for all i 6= j,k,zi = z0










The main result of the paper, which we state and prove at the end of
this Section, shows that the combination of these fairness axioms with our
3If the proviso that agents’ preferences are identical is removed, and if no other restric-
tion is imposed on the preferences of those two agents, then the resulting (much stronger)
axiom turns out to be incompatible with Pareto Indiﬀerence. See Fleurbaey and Trannoy
[9] for a proof and discussion.
4It is even compatible with a negative degree of inequality aversion.
13other axioms leads us to be inﬁnitely averse to money utility inequality. Inﬁ-
nite inequality aversion is captured by the so-called leximin, or lexicographic
maximin, aggregation criterion. For m,m0 ∈ RN, we write m ≥lex m0 if and
only if the smallest element of m is greater than the smallest element of m0,
or they are equal but the second smallest element of m is greater than the
second smallest element of m0,a n ds oo n .
Deﬁnition 1 The Money Utility Leximin function RL works as follows: For













As we want to insist in this paper on positive results, we begin by proving
that any combination of axioms deﬁned so far leads to some possibility. The
Money Utility Leximin function, indeed, satisﬁes all our axioms.
Lemma 3 The Money Utility Leximin function RL satisﬁes Independence
of Preferences over Infeasible Bundles, Consistency, Strong Pareto,t h eTrans-
fer Principle among Equals and Anonymity among Equals.
Proof. To simplify the notation, we use the money utility function
u i n t r o d u c e di nS e c t i o n3 . 1 )Independence of Preferences over Infeasible
Bundles:L e t E =( N,A,R), E0 =( N,A,R0) ∈ E, be such that for all
i ∈ N,a,a0 ∈ A ∪ {ν},m,m 0 ∈ R,(a,m) Ri (a0,m 0) ⇔ (a,m) R0
i (a0,m 0).
Then for all z,z0 ∈ Z(E), and all i ∈ N,w eh a v eu(Ri,z i)=u(R0




i), so that z RL (E) z0 ⇔ z RL (E0) z0.2 ) Consistency:
This comes from the fact that for all m,m0 ∈ RN,M ⊂ N, if mi = m0
i for all
i ∈ N \ M,t h e nm ≥lex m0 ⇒ mM ≥ m0
M and m> lex m0 ⇒ mM >m 0
M.5
3) Strong Pareto: This comes from the fact that for all m,m0 ∈ RN, if
m ≥ m0,t h e nm ≥lex m0,a n d ,i f ,i na d d i t i o n ,mj >m 0
j for some j ∈ N,t h e n
m> lex m0.4 ) Transfer Principle among Equals: Let E =( N,A,R) ∈ E,
z =( ( ai,m i))i∈N, z0 =( ( a0
i,m 0
i))i∈N ∈ Z(E), be such that for some j,k ∈ N,
Rj = Rk and for all i 6= j,k,zi = z0












k)=( ak,m k + ∆)
¤
.
5Our conventions for vector inequalities: for x,y ∈ RL,x≥ y ⇔ xl ≥ yl,∀l ∈ L,a n d
x>y⇔ x ≥ y and x 6= y.











so that z0 PL (E) z.5 )Anonymity among Equals:L e tE =( N,A,R) ∈ E, z,











so that z IL(E)z0.
Now, we pursue our analysis of money utility by showing that the fairness
axioms deﬁned above, when combined with Strong Pareto and the Money
Utility Property f o r c eu st ob ei n ﬁnitely averse to money utility inequality,
that is, characterize the Money Utility Leximin function RL.A c t u a l l y ,t h e
role played by each one of our fairness axioms turns out to be clear. Trans-
fer Principle among Equals yields the maximin property in money utility,
whereas Anonymity among Equals implies that the maximin be applied lex-
icographically. This is made clear through the following two lemmas.
Money Utility Maximin Property For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E,f o ra l l
z,z0 ∈ Z(E), if m∗,m ∗0 ∈ RN are such that zi Ii (ν,m ∗
i)a n dz0
i Ii (ν,m ∗0









i } ⇒ z P(E)z
0.
Lemma 4 I fas o c i a lo r d e r i n gf u n c t i o nR satisﬁes the Money Utility Prop-
erty, Strong Pareto and the Transfer Principle among Equals, then it satis-
ﬁes the Money Utility Maximin Property in all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E such that
#A ≥ 2.
Proof. Again, we use the u function terminology. Let E =( N,A,R) ∈ E,
z,z0 ∈ Z(E), be such that
min
i∈N





Assume, contrary to what need to be proven, that z0 R(E)z. Let E0 =
(N,A,R0) ∈ E be such that for all j,k ∈ N,R0
j = R0
k and R0
j has the property
that for all a ∈ A, m,m0 ∈ R,a n df o ra l li ∈ N,
(a,m) Ii (ν,m




which means that the willingness to pay for any object in A is greater for
R0
j than for any Ri. Moreover, we also assume that R0
j satisﬁes condition C
which is deﬁned below. Given the restriction on R0





















=m i n i∈N u(R0
i,y 0
i). Let N be partitionned
into N1, and N2 such that #N1 = n1,#N2 = n2 and
∀i ∈ N1 : u(R
0





∀i ∈ N2 : u(R
0





Note that j ∈ N1. If N2 = ∅, then, by Strong Pareto, yR(E0)y0,ac o n -
tradiction. So, let us assume that N2 6= ∅. The remaining of the proof
consists in showing that it is possible to build a new allocation y00,s u c ht h a t
y00 P(E0)y and N can still be partitionned into two sets, N0
1 and N0
2,s u c h
that #N0
1 = n1 +1a n d# N0
2 = n2 − 1. Repeating the argument n2 times
eventually yield the contradiction with Strong Pareto. Note that each rep-
etition of the argument typically requires that new preferences be deﬁned,
which, by the Money Utility Property,i sa l w a y sp o s s i b l e .L e tk ∈ N2.L e t
u00
j,u 00















l,y l),∀l = j,k.
Let a,b ∈ A. We may and do assume that a 6= b,s i n c e# A ≥ 2. We are now

























Let y,y00 ∈ Z(E0) be such that for all i 6= j,k, yi = y00
i I0
i y0
i, yj =( a,mj), yk =
(b,mk), y00
j =( a,mj + ∆), and y00













There is an interesting relationship between this lemma and results in
Fleurbaey [6] and Maniquet and Sprumont [12]. In those two papers, indeed,
fairness axioms a priori consistent with any degree of inequality aversion also
yield maximin properties when they are combined with, typically, indepen-
dence axioms. This common feature of the domains where social ordering
functions have been studied up to now stands in contrast to the income
inequality measurement framework as well as the social welfare functionals
framework. In the former model, the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer, even
when combined with diﬀerent types of independence and consistency prop-
erties do not yield the maximin property (see Chakravarty [4]). In the latter
setting, the traditional equity axiom which leads to the maximin axiom, that
is, the Hammond equity axiom, excludes by itself any ﬁnite degree of utility
inequality aversion (cfr. Hammond [10]; see also d’Aspremont and Gevers [5]
for a survey).
Lemma 5 I fas o c i a lo r d e r i n gf u n c t i o ns a t i s ﬁes the Money Utility Property,
the Maximin Money Utility Property, Consistency and Anonymity among
Equals, then it coincides with the Money Utility Leximin function RL in all
E =( N,A,R) ∈ E such that #A ≥ 2.
Proof. First let us note that the Money Utility Property clearly implies
Pareto Indiﬀerence.L e t R satisfy the axioms. Let E =( N,A,R) ∈ E
be such that #A ≥ 2. By the Money Utility Property, we can assume,
w.l.o.g., that for all i,j ∈ N,Ri = Rj. (If this condition were not satisﬁed,
then we could change the actual proﬁle of preferences into a new proﬁle
satisfying the condition, without aﬀecting the social preferences over money
utility vectors, as we did at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 4.) Let
z =( ( ai,m i))i∈N ,z0 =( ( a0
i,m 0
i))i∈N ∈ Z(E). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: z IL(E)z0.L e tn =# N.L e tσ : N → {1,...,n} be a bijection satis-
fying the property that for all i,j ∈ N, σ(i) ≥ σ(j) ⇒ u(Ri,z i) ≥ u(Rj,z j).
Let zσ ∈ Z(E) denote the allocation obtained from z by permuting its com-
ponent according to σ.L e tσ0 denote the similar bijection associated to z0,
and z0
σ0 the resulting allocation. By Anonymity among Equals, z I(E)zσ and
z0 I(E)z0
σ0. By construction, and given that z IL(E)z0, zσi Ii z0
σ0i so that by
17Pareto Indiﬀerence, zσ I(E)z0
σ0. Gathering all the above social indiﬀerences
yield z I(E)z0, the desired outcome.




Let n =# N.L e t σ,σ0,z σ,z0
σ0 be deﬁned as above. By Anonymity among
Equals, z I(E)zσ and z0 I(E)z0




Given that z PL(E)z0,t h e r ei sj ∈ N such that for all i ∈ N such that
σ(i) < σ (j),z σi Ii z0
σ0i and zσj Pj z0
σ0j. Then, N can be partitionned into
N1,N 2 and N3 such that #N1 = n1,#N2 = n2,#N3 = n3 and j = n1 +1 ,
and
∀i ∈ N1 : σ(i) ≤ n1 and u(Ri,z σi)=u(Ri,z
0
σ0i),
∀i ∈ N2 : u(Ri,z σi) >u (Ri,z
0
σ0i),
∀i ∈ N3 : u(Ri,z σi) ≤ u(Ri,z
0
σ0i).
If N1 = ∅, then by the Maximin Money Utility Property, zσ P(E)z0
σ0,a
contradiction. So let us assume that N1 6= ∅. Our strategy consists in
using Consistency to remove agents in N1 from the economy, so that agent
j has the smallest money utility, in contradiction to the Maximin Money
Utility Property, but removing those agents may yield an infeasible allocation








Let e N ⊂ N, e A ⊂ A be such that e N ∩ N = ∅,# e N = n, e A ∩ A = ∅ and
# e A = n.L e te z =( ( e ai, e mi))i∈ e N ∈ (A∗ × R)
e N , be such that
P
i∈ e N e mi <M .
Let e E =
³
e N, e A, e R
´
∈ E be such that for all i ∈ e N, e Ri = Rj. By the Money












(If this condition were not satisﬁed, then we could change the actual proﬁle of
preferences into a new proﬁle satisfying the condition, without aﬀecting the
social preferences over money utility vectors.) Let z,z0 ∈ Z(E)b ed e ﬁned
18by





∀i ∈ N1,zi = z
0




















By Pareto Indiﬀerence, zσ I(E)z and z0
σ0 I(E)z0,s ot h a tE q( 1 5 )i m p l i e s
z
0 R(E)z.
By Consistency and the claim at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 1,
(z
















which contradicts the Maximin Money Utility Property,a sa g e n tj now has






We can gather the results presented so far and state the following theorem.
Theorem 1 A social ordering function R satisﬁes Independence of Pref-
erences over Infeasible Bundles, Consistency, Strong Pareto,t h eTransfer
Principle for Equals,a n dAnonymity among Equals if and only if it is the
Money Utility Leximin function RL.
Proof. The “if” part was proven in Lemma 3. The “only if” was proven
in Lemmas 1, 4 and 5 in the case of economies E =( N,A,R) ∈ E such that
#A ≥ 2. We only need to get rid of this last restriction. But by Consistency
and the Claim at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 1, we can always go
from one object economies to two or more objects economies. Lemma 4 is
therefore valid on the entire domain E,a n ds oi sL e m m a5 .
Let us check now that none of the above axioms is redundant.
Let a∗ ∈ A. Let numerical representation of preferences v be deﬁned by
v (Ri,z i)=m ⇔ (a
∗,m) Ii zi.
19The v-utility leximin function satisﬁes all the axioms but Independence of
Preferences over Infeasible Bundles.
For a ∈ A∗,l e tma (Ri,z i)=m ⇔ (a,m) Ii zi. For all E =( N,A,R) ∈ E,
let the numerical representation of preferences w be deﬁned by





The w-utility leximin function satisﬁes all the axioms but Consistency.
The social ordering function which ranks allocations so as to minimize
the variance in money utilities satisﬁes all the axioms but Strong Pareto.
The social ordering function which ranks allocations so as to maximize
the sum of agents’ money utility satisﬁes all the axioms but the Transfer
Principle for Equals.
Let ≥ denote a complete ordering on N. The social ordering function
which coincides with the money utility leximin function in case of strict
preference, and which prefers, in case of a tie by the leximin, the allocation
where the name of agent with smallest money utility is the smaller, satisﬁes
all the axioms but Anonymity among Equals.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The particular feature of the indivisible good assignment model that is ex-
ploited in this paper is that it is always feasible not to assign any indivisible
good to one agent (that is, assign her only money). This comes from the
assumption that we can freely dispose of the objects. Consequently, a share
of agents’ consumption set always contains feasible bundles and, moreover,
is the intersection of all possible feasible sets. This is why the information
about which quantity of money would leave an agent indiﬀerent between con-
suming her actual bundle and not consuming any object but receiving this
amount of money is crucial. As it turns out, this information is suﬃcient to
construct social ordering functions.
If we had assumed, however, that there was no free disposal, so that a
social ordering only has to rank the allocations where all available objects
are allocated, then all the results we obtained would still be valid, provided
the number of objects were assumed to be strictly lower than the number of
20agents.6 Under this assumption, indeed, it is always the case that at least
one agent does not consume any object, but this agent may be anyone, so
that the set of feasible bundles always include the null object bundles.
Let us conclude by drawing two general lessons from this paper. First of
all, our result (together with results in the other recent papers studying fair
social orderings) shows that fairness can be studied through the deﬁnition
of social orderings and not only allocation rules. As explained above, social
orderings oﬀer much ﬁner judgements than allocation rules.7 On the other
hand, allocation rules can easily be deduced from social ordering functions,
by simply taking the selection to be the set of socially preferred allocations.
The allocation rule associated with the money utility leximin function then
selects the subset of eﬃcient allocations where all agents have the same money
utility, that is, they all are indiﬀerent between their assigned bundle and a
common null object bundle. Let us call it the Equal Money Utility rule. It
is an egalitarian-equivalent allocation rule, a concept introduced by Pazner
and Schmeidler [15].
There is no clear logical relationship, however, between the analysis of
social ordering functions and the analysis of allocation rules. The model
studied in this paper oﬀers the best example of this fact. For the Equal
Money Utility rule does not rely on preferences over infeasible bundles, is
consistent, selects all Pareto indiﬀerent allocations, is Pareto eﬃcient and
treats equals equally. In view of Theorem 1, one may therefore wonder if
it is the only rule satisfying those requirements. It is not, as proven by
the following example. The allocation rule which has, by far, received the
largest attention in the literature, is the one selecting the eﬃcient and envy-
free allocations (see Alkan [1], Alkan, Demange and Gale [2], Maskin [13],
Svensson [18], and Tadenuma and Thomson [19]; an exception is Bevia [3]).
An allocation is envy-free if no agent strictly prefers the bundle assigned to
any other agent over her own bundle. The eﬃcient and envy-free rule is
independent of preferences over infeasible bundles, consistent, and eﬃcient.
It treats equals equally, and selects Pareto indiﬀerent allocations. But that
6This would also require rewriting the Consistency property, and adapting the way it
is used in the proofs.
7It is often argued that the success of the theory of fair allocation (in the sense of it
uncovering mainly possibility rather than impossibility results) comes from the fact that
the attention is put on allocation rules rather than orderings (see e.g. Varian [23], Sen
[17] and Moulin and Thomson [14]). It is clear after this paper and the other papers on
social ordering functions that the argument does not hold true.
21rule is disjoint from the Equal Money Utility rule (this is a corollary of the
main result of Thomson [20]).
Our second general lesson is the following. This paper shows that, con-
trary to the general wisdom which is currently dominant in welfare economics,
it is possible to build social orderings in economic domains without relying on
interpersonal comparison of utility, so that, in particular, the social planner
objective in public economics need not be utilitarian. At least, this has been
shown in a few models. An urgent task in welfare economics, therefore, is to
extend this line of research to other models as well.
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